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Abstract
Social network data is widely shared, forwarded and published to third parties, which led to the risks of privacy disclosure. Even
thought the network provider always perturbs the data before publishing it, attackers can still recover anonymous data according
to the collected auxiliary information. In this paper, we transform the problem of de-anonymization into node matching problem
in graph, and the de-anonymization method can reduce the number of nodes to be matched at each time. In addition, we use
spectrum partitioning method to divide the social graph into disjoint subgraphs, and it can effectively be applied to large-scale social
networks and executed in parallel by using multiple processors. Through the analysis of the influence of power-law distribution on
de-anonymization, we synthetically consider the structural and personal information of users which made the feature information
of the user more practical.
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1. Introduction
Many online social networks like Facebook, Twitter or Weibo have provided great convenience for people to
contact. However, most users do not have the awareness of privacy protection , and their privacy will be obtained by
malicious third parties. Therefore, social network data analysis and privacy issues are attracting increasing attention
from researchers [1],[2],[3],[4],[5]. The privacy issue is one of the problems to be solved in online social networks.
Simply removing the ID can’t protect user’s privacy.
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To protect the privacy of users in online social networks, researchers have proposed various anonymous protection
technologies, including k-anonymity [6] and its variants l-diversity [7] and t-closeness [8], as well as differential
privacy which has good performance [9]. Some papers have proved that using auxiliary graphs to de-anonymize
anonymous network can obtain user’s identity information and attribute information to a certain extent [2],[3],[5],[10].
However, most of the de-anonymization algorithms just consider the structural features of the network and ignore the
user attributes, and it can’t characterize the node’s feature information well.
We are committed to constructing a comprehensive and realistic model to execute the de-anonymization process.
Our contribution mainly includes the following three aspects:
• we give the de-anonymization method which considers reducing the number of candidate nodes and use the
structural features and attribute values to match two nodes.
• we extract the node degree centrality, weighted node degree centrality and cluster coefficient to describe the
feature information of the nodes.
• We use spectral partitioning method to divide large-scale social networks into disjoint sub-networks, which
allows our algorithm to execute in parallel on multiple processors.
Outline. The structure of the paper is deployed as follows: In section 2 we introduce the related work. The network
model and attack model are given in section 3. Section 4 describes the de-anonymization process in detail. In section
5 we give the simulation evaluations. We summarize the paper in section 6.
2. Related Work
2.1. Anonymizaiton Methods
A simple approach of protecting user’s identity is to use anonymous technologies such as removing a user’s iden-
tification [2],[3],[11]. Although removing a user’s ID can hide the true identity of the user, this method can’t resist
the structure-based de-anonymization attack. In addition, in order to protect the user’s identity well, the k-anonymous
method [6] was proposed. The researchers extended k-anonymity and l-diversity technologies to further enhance the
performance of anonymity.
Recently, researchers used the method of differential privacy to protect relevant data. In [12], Sale et al. proposed a
differential privacy graph model to protect the privacy of user relationships (e.g., friends, partners, etc). In [13], Xiao
et al. proposed a data sanitization scheme based on differential privacy estimating the probabilities that user contact.
In [14],[15], Ji et al. studied the utility and security of the existing graph anonymity techniques. But through a large
number of analysis and experiments, the results show that the existing anonymous technologies still can’t resist the
current graph de-anonymization attacks.
2.2. De-anonymization Attack
Most previous de-anonymization techniques only consider the structural characteristics of the network using the
local and global structural features of the network to achieve the de-anonymization. In [2], Narayanan and Shmatikov
proposed a scalable and robust de-anonymization method. The attack consists two phases which can re-identify users
with low error. In [3], structure-based de-anonymization techniques are applied to the de-anonymization of mobility
trajectories. In [10], Ji et al. presented a unified method based on structured de-anonymization technology, which
can recover the social network and the mobility trajectory. In [16], Nilizadeh et al. proposed the community-based
algorithm which greatly improves the seed-based de-anonymization attacks.
None of the above de-anonymization methods take into account the user’s attribute information. In [17], Qian et al.
used knowledge graph to model the background of social network graph of attackers. By using the correlation between
user attributes, they obtained the users identity and attribute information. In [18], Jiang et al. used SA framework as
the network model, and considered the attribute differences of users which can improve the accuracy of matching. In
calculating the node similarity, the user’s attribute relevance has become an important element.
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3. Social Network Model
3.1. Social Network Graph Model
We will model the data in social networks as graph G = (V, E,W, A), where V ={i|i is a node} represents user set in
the social network, E = {ei j|i, j ∈ V} represents the relationship between users, W = {wi j|i, j ∈ V} is the weight set on
edges, A = (v1, v2, ...) is user’s attribute. Specifically, the set of attributes for user i is denoted by Ai. Assume that the
anonymous graph released by the data owner is Ga = (Va, Ea,Wa, Aa). Further we define n = |V | and m = |E| as the
number of users in the graph and the number of edges respectively, and N(i) is the neighbor set of the user.
3.2. Attack Model
Online social network providers publish anonymous dataGa to third parties. We assume that the provider is honest
and will not reveal additional data to others. Attackers can obtain some information about the user through various
means which constructed an auxiliary graph. And the auxiliary graph is represented byGu = (Vu, Eu,Wu, Au). Attack-
ers have the ability to access the data of anonymous graph, so that the collected data can be analyzed and utilized.
The purpose of the attacker is to use the collected auxiliary information to obtain the user identity in the anonymous
graph.
4. Scheme Detail
The main steps of our scheme are as follows. Firstly, we divide a large-scale social graph into smaller subgraphs
by using the method in [19]. Secondly, we match the subgraphs of the anonymous and auxiliary graphs. Thirdly, we
present a model of matching nodes in the matched subgraphs. Finally, we consider the network structure and attribute
information to measure the similarity between nodes.
4.1. Structural Similarity of Nodes
To measure the structural similarity, we extract the degree centrality, weighted degree centrality and clustering
coefficient of nodes.
4.1.1. Nodes Degree Centrality
The degree centrality of a node is defined as the number of edges connected to this node. For example, considering
the arbitrary social graph G = (V, E,W, A), the degree of node v ∈ V is dv = |N(v)|, where |N(v)| is the number of v′
neighbors.
In calculating the degree of centrality of the weighted graph, we use the definition of weighted centrality given in
[20]. For node v ∈ V , the degree of centrality of v is defined as:wdv = dv(
∑
u∈N(v) wvu
dv
)α,Where α is a positive tuning
parameter. When 0  α  1, the large degree is regarded to be important; when α  1, the weight is regarded to be
important.
4.1.2. Nodes Clustering Coefficient
The clustering coefficient [21] measures the degree to which nodes tend to cluster together in social graph G. The
clustering coefficientCi of node vi ∈ V is defined as the number of edges connected to this node divided by the number
of all possible edges between its neighboring nodes. For a directed graph, the number of possible edges between all
neighbors N(vi) of vi is ki(ki−1), where ki is the number of neighbors of node vi. Therefore, the clustering coefficient
for directed graph is defined as:
Ci =
|ei j : vi, v j ∈ Ni, ei j ∈ E|
ki(ki − 1) (1)
Through the above introduction, now we extract the structural features of networks. Firstly, for the nodes vi ∈ Va
and v j ∈ Vu, we define their structural feature vectors S a(vi), S u(v j) as S a(vi) = [di,wdi,Ci], S u(v j) = [d j,wdj,C j]
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Fig. 1. The impact of w1,sr2,sra and sru on de-anonymization accuracy and run time.
respectively. Next, we define the structural similarity S s between two nodes vi ∈ Va and v j ∈ Vu as the cosine similarity
between these two vectors:
S S (vi, v j) =
S a(vi) · S u(v j)
‖S a(vi)‖‖S u(v j)‖ (2)
4.2. Attribute Similarity of Nodes
We have given the basic model of social network G = (V, E,W, A), where A is the user’s attribute. For each user
vi in the graph, Ai = (vi1, vi2, ..., vim) represents its attribute vector, where vik = 1 if user has this attribute; otherwise
vak = 0. When calculating the attribute similarity S A between nodes, we consider the number of common attributes the
two nodes have. Specifically, for two nodes vi ∈ Va, v j ∈ Vu, the attribute similarity S A(vi, v j) = |Ai⋂ Aj|/|Ai⋃ Aj|.
4.3. The Similarity Between Nodes
Now, we define the similarity S im(vi, v j) for vi ∈ Va and v j ∈ Vu as follows:
S im(vi, v j) = w1S S (vi, v j) + w2S A(vi, v j) (3)
where w1,w2 are weight coefficients, and w1 + w2 = 1. If w1 > w2, it means that the structural information is more
important; vice versa.
4.4. De-anonymization
We consider a practical social network characteristic here, that is, scale-free degree distribution. The node degree
in the network follows power-law distributions. Therefore, we select the node with the largest degree of nodes in each
subgraph to start our method. The execution of the de-anonymization process is similar to percolation-based method.
Firstly, the node with the largest degree in the graph is de-anonymized and then its neighbors. In this process, it just
compares the nodes in the neighbors of matched nodes. It can reduce the complexity of the algorithm efficiently.
5. Experiment Evaluations
We conducted experiments on two large social network datasets, Facebook and Google+, in the real world. They
are from the Standford Network Analysis Project (SNAP). In the experiments, the default value of parameters w1,w2
in the algorithm are w1 = w2 = 0.5. At the same time, the default settings of sampling frequency for generating
anonymized graph and auxiliary graph are sra = sru = sr1 = 0.8. Assume that the attribute information of nodes
in the two networks is obtained by sampling from the original attribute information, and the sampling frequency sr2
defaults to 0.9. The experimental operating environment is: Intel CoreTM 2.4GHz 8-core CPU 16G ROM.
In Fig. 1(ab), we show the effects of parameters w1 and sr2 on the accuracy and runtime. In Fig. 1(a), it verifies
the idea that attribute information has a positive effect on de-anonymization algorithm. In Fig. 1(b), we can see that
when sr2 is small, the accuracy of the algorithm is low, because the perturbation of the attribute information is large
at this time. With the increase of sr2, the accuracy of the algorithm also gradually increases, which further illustrates
the ideal that the attribute has an auxiliary effect on the accuracy of the algorithm.
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In Fig. 1(cd), we show the influence of the edge sampling frequencies sra and sru on the accuracy and running time
of the matching. From Fig. 1(c) we can see that when sra and sru are close to 1, the de-anonymization algorithm has
a very high accuracy. In Fig. 1(d) we calculate the running time of the algorithm at different sampling frequencies.
The experiments on Google+ have similar results. For Facebook, the default value of weight is 1 when calculating
the weight of the edge. When calculating the edge weight of Google+, if the edge between two nodes is bidirectional,
it is set to 2, otherwise it is set to 1.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a comprehensive and realistic social network graph model, in which not only the struc-
tural features of graphs but also the user attribute information are considered. In addition, we use the graph partitioning
method to divide social graph which reduces the scale of the problem effectively and enables the method executed in
parallel. We also verified the method through the realistic social networks.
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